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Abstract
In a model of dynamic duopoly, optimal price policies are characterized as-
suming consumers learn adaptively about the relative quality of the two products.
A contrast is made between belief-based and reinforcement learning. Under re-
inforcement learning, consumers can become locked into the habit of purchasing
inferior goods. Such lock-in permits the existence of multiple history-dependent
asymmetric steady states in which one firm dominates. In contrast, belief-based
learning rules must lead asymptotically to correct beliefs about the relative quality
of the two brands and so in this case there is a unique steady state.
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1 Introduction
Adaptive learning models attempt to describe the behavior of agents faced with re-
peated decision problems by assuming they use simple learning rules. These models
are used in a number of apparently disparate environments. Economic theorists have
analyzed them in abstract settings.1 They have been fitted to actual choice data both
in economic experiments and the quite diﬀerent context of the empirical analysis of
consumer behavior.2 Despite diﬀerences in aims and terminology, some models of dy-
namic choice found in empirical marketing analysis are essentially the same as those
used in economic theory. This research in marketing supports the experimental evidence
that even simple adaptive learning models can help to explain human behavior. In the
context of econometric work on experimental data, there has been an active debate as
whether the more sophisticated belief-based models or very simple reinforcement learn-
ing models oﬀer the better fit. Up to now, this has been of interest because it throws
light upon human reasoning processes. However, if the same question is considered
in the context of consumer choice, there may be significant practical implications to
consider as well.
This paper investigates the hypothesis that whether consumer behavior is best de-
scribed by belief-based or reinforcement learning may have a significant impact on
market organization. In particular, we examine a model of dynamic duopoly, where
consumers learn about the relative quality of the two diﬀerent brands. The product
is an experience good and so information is partial: consumers only learn the payoﬀ
to the good they actually consume. First, we investigate a reinforcement type learn-
ing model, where more familiar products have a greater probability of being selected.
Consequently, consumers can become locked into inferior choices. Such lock-in per-
mits the existence of multiple history-dependent steady states. When multiple steady
states exist, even if the two firms are identical in terms of costs and product quality,
the symmetric outcome is unstable: one firm must dominate. This outcome under re-
inforcement learning is then contrasted with the outcome under belief-based learning.
This form of learning leads to correct beliefs about relative quality even under partial
information. Firms can influence consumer opinion only in the short run: if consumers’
initial estimate of a firm’s quality is high (low), it has an incentive to charge above
(below) the myopic price in order to slow (speed up) learning. Given the convergence of
beliefs to the unique correct outcome, the firms must converge to a unique steady state,
where prices are the same as under complete information. This paper, therefore, shows
that the small diﬀerences in the learning rules, between belief-based and reinforcement
learning, can have dramatic eﬀects on market outcomes.
1Theoretical papers in this field include Arthur (1993), Rustichini (1999), Börgers and Sarin (2000),
Sarin and Vahid (1999), Börgers et al. (2004). A survey of the use of adaptive learning models in
games can be found in Fudenberg and Levine (1998).
2Empirical work includes Erev and Roth (1998), Camerer and Ho (1999), Erev and Barron (2001)
and Blume et al. (2002). Examples of work in marketing are Chintagunta and Rao (1996), Seetharaman
and Chintagunta (1998), Ho and Chong (2003).
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The situation to be modelled can be thought of as a consumer going on a regular
basis to a supermarket to buy a grocery item and choosing between two competing
brands. This type of decision has several aspects which I would like to emphasize. First,
the prices for the competing brands are usually clearly marked on the shelves. Thus,
the learning the consumer has to undertake is not about prices or their distribution.
However, the goods in question are typically experience goods. One has to take them
home and consume them before their quality is known. Second, quality in this context
is very often subjective and imprecise, for example, whether a food product tastes
good. Third, because each successive purchase decision is relatively unimportant to
an individual consumer, a model of boundedly-rational behavior may explain actual
choices well. Such boundedly-rational agents may have a impression of quality that is
ambiguous and diﬃcult to measure against past experience. As a consequence, it may
be very diﬃcult to be confident about relative quality. For example, I think I like the
brand I bought today, but is it clearly better than the one I bought last month? Indeed,
in this paper it is assumed that the consumption experience is noisy and memory is
imperfect.
The formal model of price competition analyzed here is derived from that of Chin-
tagunta and Rao (1996), who similarly consider a dynamic duopoly with adaptive con-
sumers. Their work is quite distinctive from most of the literature in economics on
learning. First, there is the mixture of rational behavior by sellers and reinforcement
learning by boundedly rational buyers. Second, while the recent literature on adaptive
learning has largely focussed on abstract exogenous environments, Chintagunta and
Rao’s work is also empirical. The model is fitted to data on actual prices, sales and
consumer purchases. They find, for example, that a dynamic specification, taking into
account consumers’ past purchases, outperforms a static logit model. This result, as I
argue in Section 7 of this paper, provides some support for the hypothesis that learning
is in fact suboptimal.
Nonetheless, the diﬀerence between this current paper and the work of Chintagunta
and Rao (1996) is large, and reflects the diﬀerence between economics and marketing
science. First, the principal question here is one of welfare: do consumers learn to make
correct choices and what is the implication that has for the competitiveness of the
resulting market structure. In contrast, Chintagunta and Rao’s (1996) main objective,
as with much marketing analysis, is to predict consumer choice. Second, Chintagunta
and Rao do not investigate whether the reinforcement learning rule they specify would
lead a consumer to choose the brand which she would prefer in the case of perfect
information. We show that frequently this will not be the case. Third, Chintagunta
and Rao, in characterizing the dynamic pricing equilibrium, did not identify, as is done
here, that there may be multiple steady states. Finally, in their paper only one learning
rule is considered. Here, the results under reinforcement learning are contrasted with
those resulting under belief based learning, thereby demonstrating that it is familiarity
based learning that is responsible for the pathological outcome, and not the situation
of experience goods in itself.
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This latter point is also what diﬀerentiates the current work from an earlier litera-
ture, Schmalensee (1978) and Smallwood and Conlisk (1979), that concentrates exclu-
sively on simple forms of reinforcement learning. In these models also, consumers do
not necessarily learn which is the highest quality brand. The contribution here is to
clarify the conditions on the form of consumer learning under which this is possible.
Furthermore, in the last few years, the analysis of experimental data has shown the
eﬀectiveness of adaptive learning models in predicting subject behavior. This, com-
bined with the empirical marketing work of Chintagunta and Rao (1996) and Ho and
Chong (2003), oﬀers the intriguing prospect of estimating consumer learning models
with actual consumer choices. Given the theoretical diﬀerences between reinforcement
and belief-based learning, in Section 7, I oﬀer two empirical tests that potentially could
distinguish between the two models.
The focus on bounded rationality diﬀerentiates this paper from most previous litera-
ture on dynamic pricing of experience goods that has assumed fully rational consumers.3
One strand of the existing literature is based on the quality of the good being private
information to the seller. The consumer then learns about product quality by making
highly sophisticated inferences from the resulting strategic behavior of firms. Depend-
ing on the model and/or the parameters of a single model, a seller can signal that the
quality of her good is higher than the alternative by charging a price that is either
higher or lower than the price that would be myopically optimal (Milgrom and Roberts
(1986); Bagwell and Riordan (1991)). Here, consumers can only learn if a brand is
of high quality through repeated consumption experience. Bergemann and Välikmäki
(1996) is much closer in that it examines the eﬀect of strategic pricing on the rate of
information acquisition by a buyer. However, it is quite diﬀerent in that the buyer’s be-
havior is given by the solution to a stochastic dynamic optimization problem, allowing
for an optimal level of experimentation.
Strategic and adaptive models may well be complementary, with diﬀerent models
doing better in diﬀerent circumstances. For example, Bergemann and Välikmäki (1996),
to motivate their model of optimal learning, give the example of a factory manager
choosing which production technology to buy. Indeed, such professional decision-makers
faced with sharp incentives may well be well-described by optimal learning models.
Adaptive models, on the other hand, may do well in those consumer markets where a
single purchase represents very small stakes. Indeed, this paper is not the first to apply
learning models to consumer behaviour. Weisbuch, Kirman and Herreiner (2000) and
Kirman and Vriend (2001), in work that is very close to the present approach, analyze
adaptive learning models of consumer behavior and similarly examine conditions under
which consumers become loyal to one seller. The principal diﬀerence is that here firms
are forward looking and price dynamically. Erev and Haruvy (2001) also consider
the implications of adaptive learning by consumers but again firms have fixed pricing
policies.4 Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) look at social learning, where agents learn from
3Belief-based adaptive learning, although more sophisticated than reinforcement learning is still
some way short of full rationality in the traditional sense.
4Other work on adaptive learning has had adaptive learning by sellers as well as by buyers (Hopkins
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the experience of others as well as from their own. Certainly researchers in consumer
behavior have found it plausible that consumers may be prone to a number of cognitive
biases, see for example Erdem et al. (1999). One which seems particular relevant
in this context is “confirmatory bias”. As Rabin and Schrag (1999) discover, there
is substantial psychological evidence that once individuals form a hypothesis, they pay
greater attention to subsequent evidence that supports that hypothesis than to evidence
that is non-supportive. In the current context, this would suggest that consumers may
be relatively unwilling to switch away from a favored brand.
This paper highlights a source of bias that is even more basic, but which has sig-
nificant implications for market organization. Imagine a consumer who initially has
greater goodwill towards brand X than the rival brand Y. So, all other factors being
equal, she will mostly purchase X, and only rarely sample Y. Now, suppose her choice
decision is based on beliefs: estimates of the relative quality of the two brands. Then,
the low frequency of purchase of Y will not matter in the long run, as eventually she
will accumulate a suﬃcient number of observations to gain a clear picture of the average
quality of Y, and if this is higher than that of X, she will switch allegiance. In contrast,
suppose a consumer chooses on the basis of familiarity, a stock of goodwill. Then, in
the intervening time between purchases of Y, when he is consuming X, that stock of
goodwill towards Y diminishes, he forgets about it. The probability of buying Y falls.
He may then never accumulate suﬃcient positive experience to realize that in fact Y
is just as good, or even superior. That is, quite subtle diﬀerence in mental attitude
toward choices not made, products not consumed, can have quite profound eﬀects on
long run outcomes.
The result is that, when consumers are reinforcement learners, possession of a high
initial market share is self-reinforcing. There is an extensive literature in industrial
organization concerned with the origins of market dominance. Recent theoretical ex-
planations for sustained dominance include network eﬀects, increasing returns to scale
and learning by doing. Here none of these factors are present but there is still lock-in.
This, however, is broadly consistent with the empirical findings of Sutton (1991) on in-
dustries in the food sector, where some outcomes seem history dependent in industries,
without network externalities, but where consumer tastes, loyalty and perceptions of
quality are important.
In examining dynamic oligopoly, there is the question of which equilibrium concept
to use. Open loop equilibrium, as used by Chintagunta and Rao (1996), earlier by
Schmalensee (1978) and more recently, for example, by Cellini and Lambertini (1998),
has the advantage of analytic simplicity. It is true that many researchers in industrial
organization prefer Markov perfect/closed loop equilibrium, despite the fact that, except
in simple linear-quadratic models, its complexity precludes analysis except by numerical
methods. In contrast, the open loop equilibrium can be analyzed qualitatively, revealing
much information such as the number of steady states and their stability. Furthermore,
the known disadvantages of open loop equilibria, that it in eﬀect allows commitment to
and Seymour (2002); Harrington and Chen (2003)).
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a complete strategy path, are limited here as firms compete on price not quantity. That
is, the fact that the open loop equilibrium in the model analysed here has asymmetric
steady states cannot be attributed to a Stackleberg phenomenon, where one firm obtains
dominance simply by committing to a high level of output. Finally, Markov perfect
equilibrium is useful for the analysis of how firms respond to stochastic realisations of
demand or other variables. But in the current model, while the evolution of individual
consumer behaviour is stochastic, there are no aggregate shocks. So, it is possible
that a deterministic approximation, averaging over a large number of consumers, can
capture the essentials of consumer behaviour. In turn, open loop equilibrium may be a
reasonable approach. This is discussed further in Section 6.
2 Adaptive Learning, Hypothetical Reasoning and
Suboptimal Learning
This section introduces the models of adaptive learning used in this analysis and reviews
the evidence as to whether adaptive learning can lead to optimal choices. A crucial
aspect will be how capable an agent is of hypothetical reasoning, in particular, how she
treats the question, “How well would I have done, if I had chosen diﬀerently from the
choice I actually made?” This matters, as in many choice situations, including that of
experience goods, one only sees the payoﬀ to the choice actually consumed, leaving one
to speculate if one could have done better by having chosen diﬀerently. The danger is
that since the value of unchosen alternative is less clear, one will become convinced that
one’s own choice is superior, simply because it was the one chosen, not because of any
objective superiority. As we will see, there is both theoretical and empirical evidence
that this can be an important phenomenon.
Models of learning have been employed both to explain behavior in games and in
single person decision making. There is now considerable evidence that they can ex-
plain actual choice behavior (Erev and Roth, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999; Erev and
Barron, 2001). In games, payoﬀs are determined by the choices of one’s opponents
and in decision problems, by an exogenous random process, but in both cases, learn-
ing rules have three components. First, a decision maker is endowed with propensities
(alternative terms are assessments or weights or scores), one for each of the possible
actions in her action set. The propensities of a representative agent we denote as
θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θn) ∈ IRn, when the agent must choose from n actions. Second, there is a
choice rule that chooses an action as a function of current propensities. A general prin-
ciple is that actions with higher propensities are chosen with higher probability. Finally,
there is an updating rule, which changes the propensities in response to experience.
The choice rule that has attracted the most attention is the logit or exponential rule
xi(t) =
exp(βθi(t))Pn
j=1 exp(βθj(t))
. (1)
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where xi(t) is the probability that the agent chooses action i at time t. In the exponential
choice rule, the parameter β represents the degree of optimization. At high levels of β
the agent will choose the action with the highest propensity with very high probability.
There have been two commonly used diﬀering assumptions about what information
is available when updating propensities. If an agent in each period can observe the
return to all possible actions, including the “foregone” payoﬀs to actions that were not
taken, this is “full” information in the terminology of Rustichini (1999). If, however, the
agent can only see the payoﬀ to the action actually taken this is “partial” information.
A crucial assumption here is that a consumer choosing amongst experience goods is in
a situation of partial information: she only finds out about the good that she actually
chooses. Therefore, we look at adaptive learning models that only use information
about actual payoﬀs.
The payoﬀ that an agent receives at any given time will be random in two senses.
First, this is because given a choice rule such as the logit above, the action she chooses
will be random. Second, in addition, it is assumed that experience is stochastic. Specif-
ically, if at time t, conditional on taking the action i an agent receives a payoﬀ u˜i(t)
which is a random variable with mean ui.
Our first updating rule can be called reinforcement learning. Upon receiving a
payoﬀ, the agent then updates his propensities
θi(t+ 1) = (1− δ)θi(t) + δu˜i(t)
θj(t+ 1) = (1− δ)θj(t), for all j 6= i (2)
where 1 ≥ δ > 0 is a “recency” parameter. If δ is equal to one, then only the very
last experience is remembered. With δ close to zero, experience from long ago may still
have a significant weight in current beliefs. Crucially, this rule responds only to realized
payoﬀs. No information about payoﬀs to actions not taken is utilized. This assumption
is found in the reinforcement learning models put forward by Arthur (1993) and Erev
and Roth (1998). This may be because the payoﬀ to other actions at that time was not
observed, there is partial information, or the learner is boundedly rational. Another
model that uses only partial information has recently been proposed by Sarin and Vahid
(1999).5 The rule is, if action/good i is chosen at time t, then
θi(t+ 1) = (1− δ)θi(t) + δu˜i(t)
θj(t+ 1) = θj(t) for all j 6= i. (3)
Note that the first and second learning rule diﬀer from each other in an important
sense. The second can be thought of as a “belief-based” learning rule, in that each θi
is an estimate of the payoﬀ to each action. In contrast, our first rule is best described
as a reinforcement or stimulus-response type learning rule. Here, each θi cannot be
5Fudenberg and Levine (1998, Chapter 4) have a similar model, as do Kirman and Vriend (2001).
But it is also true that this form of learning rule had already been studied for some time in the artificial
intelligence field, see Sutton and Barto (1998).
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interpreted as a belief; it is rather a stock of positive feeling. With a belief-based
model, the consumer is assumed to have a belief, albeit adaptively formed, of the
quality of each of the diﬀerent brands. With a reinforcement model, a propensity
potentially incorporates a much wider set of feelings, such as familiarity or recognition.
For example, when a consumer in a hurry grabs a product oﬀ a shelf maybe it is not
because he believes it oﬀers the best value for money but because it is the only product
he recognizes.
What turns out to be the crucial diﬀerence between reinforcement and belief-based
learning is the treatment of the propensities of actions not taken. With reinforcement
based on familiarity, rule (2), the propensity for actions not chosen naturally decreases
as familiarity with those actions/products declines. In contrast, under the belief-based
rule (3), the propensity for actions unchosen remains unaltered, as there is no new
information about the action/product with which to update one’s quality estimate.
Most attempts to distinguish empirically between reinforcement and belief-based
learning models have attempted to see whether information on foregone payoﬀs is in
fact used. That is, the attempt has been to distinguish between the reinforcement rule
(2) and the rule
θi(t+ 1) = (1− δ)θi(t) + δu˜i(t) for i = 1, 2, ..., n. (4)
This last rule is only applicable under full information as it uses information about
all possible actions to update simultaneously all propensities. However, as here we
concentrate on experience goods, where there is only partial information, diﬀerences in
reaction to information about foregone payoﬀs will not be important, as this information
is not available.
Do diﬀerent updating rules lead to diﬀerent outcomes? In particular, do these rules
lead an agent to optimal choices? For example, suppose each u˜i(t) is an independent
draw from a fixed distribution with mean ui. Then, if these means were known, the
optimal action would clearly be to choose always the action with the highest mean
payoﬀ. Can agents learn to do this without any prior information about payoﬀs? With
the belief-based Sarin and Vahid rule (3), at least asymptotically an agent’s choices will
be close to optimal. Informally, if δ is “small”, then asymptotically each θi will be close
to ui. That is, in the long run an agent will have correct estimates of the return to each
strategy. This implies that using, for example, the logit choice rule (1) for a high β,
asymptotically the agent will place a very high probability on the optimal action (see
Sarin and Vahid (1999)). Similar results can also be shown to hold for the rule (4).
But, importantly as Rustichini (1999) points out, if one combines the reinforcement
updating rule (2) with the logit choice rule (1), optimality is not always achieved.6
The asymptotic result is history dependent, with the agent likely to become locked into
choosing the strategy she initially favors independent of whether it is optimal. That is,
6The first “lock-in” result under adaptive learning is found in the pioneering work of Arthur (1993).
His results were in a slightly diﬀerent context, however. See Hopkins and Posch (2005) for a fuller
discussion of the issues involved.
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the exponential choice rule in a situation of partial information can be interpreted as
a form of overconfidence. With a high value of β the action that seems the best will
be chosen with a high probability. Therefore, under partial information, the agent may
never find out that another action would actually give a higher payoﬀ.
What evidence is there that this might happen in practice? Erev and Barron (2001)
report on a large number of single person decision experiments. First, Erev and Barron
claim that a reinforcement learning model similar to a combination of the learning rule
(2) and the exponential choice rule (1), identified by Rustichini (1999) as non-optimal,
is a better fit to actual behavior than the model of Sarin and Vahid, that is optimal
in this context. Second, this is perhaps because, as the individual data reveals, many
subjects, even when there are only two possible actions, end up choosing the inferior
action. Lastly, Chintagunta and Rao (1996) and Ho and Chong (2003) fit reinforcement
type learning models on actual consumer choices. It is argued in Section 7 that their
findings give some support for the hypothesis that learning is suboptimal.
This tendency to become locked into one particular choice, simply because of an
initial preference is reminiscent of “confirmatory bias” which has been well-documented
in the psychology literature (see, for example, Rabin and Schrag (1999)). This can be
defined as the tendency to interpret new evidence as supporting an existing belief even
if it is not truly favorable. This trait is to some extent captured by the learning rule
(2), in which one’s opinion of the action not chosen continuously deteriorates. However,
in this context there is a further problem. By repeatedly choosing only one option, an
agent can avoid seeing any evidence that is favorable to the alternative. The likelihood
of being locked into one’s initial choice therefore would seem to be even higher.
3 A Model of Dynamic Duopoly
In this section, the dynamic duopoly model with learning by consumers is introduced.
This is similar to the earlier model of Chintagunta and Rao (1996) (hereafter, “CR”),
though as discussed in the Introduction, there are diﬀerences in approach and in the
results obtained. There are two firms that produce a product at constant marginal cost.
Marginal cost for both brands is normalized to zero. Prices are given by p = (p1, p2).
We also use the diﬀerence in prices q = p1 − p2. For simplicity, we consider a single
representative consumer. Reasons why this may serve as a reasonable approximation
of the more realistic case of a large population of consumers are given in Section 6. In
any case, this consumer has goodwill for the two brands equal to θ = (θ1, θ2). θ1 can
be thought of as the consumer’s estimate of quality of the first firm’s product and θ2
the estimate of the quality of the alternative. We will also use η = θ1 − θ2, the relative
goodwill toward the first brand.
At each point in time the consumer seeks to buy one unit of the good, either from
firm 1 or firm 2. The consumer uses a decision rule of the logit form. This rule has been
extensively used in the literature on learning and is given in its usual form in (1). Here
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it is modified to take into account that the decision has two aspects, price as well as
the utility of consumption. The expected utility of purchasing the first brand is θ1− p1
and the utility of purchasing the alternative is θ2 − p2. Therefore, the logit rule will
give the probability of purchasing from the first firm as
x1(θ, p) =
exp(β(θ1 − p1))
exp(β(θ1 − p1)) + exp(β(θ2 − p2))
=
exp(β(η − q))
exp(β(η − q)) + 1 (5)
where β > 0 is a parameter measuring the sensitivity to goodwill and prices.7 The
probability of purchasing the second brand is x2(θ, p) = 1 − x1. Clearly, here if prices
are equal, and if β is large, the consumer will purchase the brand with the higher
associated θ with a probability close to one. Let x(θ, p) denote the vector of market
shares (x1, x2).
The consumer’s goodwill will change over time in response to her consumption
experience. If she consumes good i at time t, then she receives a utility of u˜i(t). It
is assumed that u˜i(t) is an independent draw from a constant distribution with mean
ui > 0. Let u∗ = u1 − u2, that is, the actual expected quality premium of the first
brand. A learning rule in this context will be a way of updating goodwill θ in response
to the consumption experience u˜i(t). This paper uses several diﬀerent learning rules, as
set out in the previous section, each representing diﬀerent behavioral assumptions, and
each having diﬀering predictions.
Each firm is assumed to know the learning rule of the consumer and we can assume
also that each is able to observe purchase patterns and therefore should at any given
time have a good estimate of the consumer’s goodwill. The actual evolution of goodwill
will be follow the consumer’s consumption experience and will be stochastic. There are
various methods applicable for stochastic dynamic optimization. In eﬀect, it is assumed
that each firm uses stochastic approximation theory, which predicts the stochastic evo-
lution of goodwill by the solution of an associated diﬀerential equation. The first step
is to calculate an expected change in θ which we can write as
E[θi(t+ 1)|θ(t)]− θi(t) = δfi(θ, x(θ, p)),
where the exact form of fi(·) depends on which of the two learning rules, (2) or (3),
that is currently under analysis. Stochastic approximation, which has been widely
used in the recent literature on learning, shows that if δ is small, the solution of the
original stochastic diﬀerence equation to the diﬀerential equation (6) will be closely
approximated by the solution to the following parallel continuous time system
θ˙i = fi(θ, x(θ, p)). (6)
We assume that this approximation is close enough for the purposes of the firms, and
7In Chintagunta and Rao’s original specification, allowance was made for β to take diﬀerent values
for the two goods whereas the utility from consumption of any good was normalized to unity. I opt for
a convention which is closer to the learning literature where β is fixed but the average consumption
utility ui varies across the brands. See also Section 7.
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that each attempts to solve the deterministic continuous time optimization problem
implied by (6).8
Note that here, just as in CR’s original model, price only aﬀects the evolution
of goodwill through the probability of purchase x(θ, p) and not directly. There are
arguments for and against this modelling choice. The model is intended to represent
the situation of a consumer choosing between products in a supermarket, where prices
are clearly displayed. In that sense, because current prices are easily available, the
consumer’s choice may not be aﬀected by her knowledge of past prices. On the other
hand, a consumer may not check prices again each time he shops. In which case, his
choice in a particular period may be determined by his impression about which of the
brands is the least expensive, an impression formed by past prices.9
Given the assumption of a representative consumer, firm i’s instantaneous profits
will be pi(t)xi(t). Each firm seeks to maximizeZ ∞
t=0
e−rtpixi(θ, p) dt subject to θ˙ = f(θ, x(θ, p)), (7)
where r > 0 is the firms’ common discount rate. This in turn gives rise to a current-value
Hamiltonian for each firm,
Hi = pixi(θ, p) + µifi(θ, x(θ, p)) + νifj(θ, x(θ, p)), (8)
where µi, νi are firm i’s costate variables, and fj(·) gives the expected motion of the other
firm’s goodwill. The dynamics of the costate variables are given by µ˙i = −∂Hi/∂θi+rµi
and ν˙i = −∂Hi/∂θj+ rνi. If each firm maximizes its Hamiltonian at each point in time
treating its opponent’s price as fixed, this constitutes a Nash equilibrium in open loop
strategies (see, for example, Kamien and Schwartz (2000, Chapter 23)). An open loop
strategy is a path for prices pi(t) as a function of initial goodwill θ(0) and calendar
time t only. Open loop equilibrium, therefore, assumes that the firms choose such
strategies simultaneously and independently at the beginning of the game. They are
then committed to the resultant price path for whole rest of the game. We characterize
these equilibrium strategies in the next section and discuss the applicability of open
loop equilibrium in this context in Section 6.
It will be useful to contrast the optimal policy derived from the above dynamic
equilibrium. with the myopic policy, where each firm seeks to maximize instantaneous
profits, which from (5), can be written pixi(η, q). Then, each firm charges the static
duopoly price, which I will write as pˆ(η) as it will depend on the current level of relative
goodwill. That is, pˆ(η) solves the simultaneous equations xi(η, p) + pi∂xi(η, p)/∂pi = 0
8An introduction to stochastic approximation is given in Fudenberg and Levine (1998, Ch. 4).
Benaïm (1999) provides a more extensive survey. Benaïm (1998) considers the case we consider here,
where δ is constant.
9The model could be modified to incorporate such eﬀects. However, while it would lead to lower
prices, as each firm has an additional dynamic incentive to lower prices to build goodwill, I hypothesize
it would not lead to substantial qualitative changes in behavior.
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for i = 1, 2 or equivalently, it solves
pi =
1
β(1− xi(η, p))
(9)
again for i = 1, 2 and p = (p1, p2).10 One of the principal questions of this analysis will
be when will the sellers have an incentive to charge a price above or below pˆ(η).
4 Equilibrium under Reinforcement by Familiarity
In this section, the change in goodwill for the consumer follows what is now the standard
reinforcement learning updating rule. This is CR’s original model with slight modifi-
cations to the definition of the choice function (5) as noted in Section 3. This learning
rule has been popularized in the field of economics by Erev and Roth (1998) and was
given in Section 2 as rule (2). What is crucial about this rule is that the consumer’s
opinion of the brand not chosen deteriorates, with the consequence that the consumer
becomes progressively more convinced that he has chosen correctly, even if that choice
is not in fact optimal.
Moving to the expected motion and continuous time, one obtains (for convenience,
in this and in what follows, I suppress the dependence of the market shares x1, x2 on
goodwill θ and prices p)
θ˙1 = x1u1 − θ1, θ˙2 = x2u2 − θ2. (10)
Remember as stated in Section 2, we cannot interpret the θ parameters as beliefs.
Rather, they are measures of goodwill. Furthermore, we will see that they tend to
diverge to extreme values: the consumer will become loyal to one product alone. In this
case, it is easier to replace the two goodwill variables (θ1, θ2) with the single variable
giving relative goodwill η = θ1 − θ2. One can calculate that
η˙ = x1u1 − x2u2 − η (11)
The Hamiltonian for firm i becomes
Hi = pixi + ξi(x1u1 − x2u2 − η) (12)
where ξi is the new costate variable replacing µi and νi. Diﬀerentiating each Hi with
respect to pi and setting to zero, given that ∂xi/∂pi = −βxi(1− xi) prices satisfy
p1 =
1
βx2
− ξ1(u1 + u2), p2 =
1
βx1
+ ξ2(u1 + u2). (13)
10It has been established by Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991) that Nash equilibrium in oligopoly with
logit demand functions exists and is unique.
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The dynamics of the costate variables ξ1, ξ2 can be derived from the basic formula
ξ˙i = −∂Hi/∂η + rξi. Substituting in from (13) the resulting diﬀerential equations can
be written,
ξ˙1 = ξ1(1 + r)− x1, ξ˙2 = ξ2(1 + r) + x2. (14)
First, it is interesting to compare prices in the dynamic duopoly with the myopic level
pˆ(η). As is common in dynamic models, prices are set at a level below static duopoly
levels, as there is an incentive to price low to build goodwill.
Proposition 1 Let p∗(η) solve (13). Then on any optimal price path, each firm’s price
p∗(η) is always less than the myopic level pˆ(η).
Proof: In the Appendix.
Turning to the steady states of the duopoly, in any such steady state by definition
η˙ = 0, ξ˙1 = 0 and ξ˙2 = 0. This combined with the first order condition (13) gives us
the following equations
q+
(u1 + u2)(2x1(η, q)− 1)
1 + r
=
1
βx2(η, q)
− 1
βx1(η, q)
, η = x1(η, q)u1−x2(η, q)u2, (15)
where q = p1 − p2 is the relative price. These are nonlinear simultaneous equations,
with possible multiple solutions. The nonlinearity arises from the nonlinearity of the
demand function xi(η, q) and the degree of its nonlinearity depends on the optimization
parameter β. For example, if β is very small then x1(η, q) ≈ xˆ1(η, q) = 1/2+β(η−q)/4.
If one were to replace x1 with the linear approximation xˆ1, the steady state equations
(15) themselves become linear, and a single solution would be guaranteed. However,
for higher levels of β, the demand function x1 is extremely nonlinear, and we do indeed
have multiple steady states.
In particular, the equations (15) in fact can be consistent with three distinct steady
states. For example, with u1 = u2 = u, the two products are in eﬀect identical. However,
if one assumes for convenience that u = 2, r = 1, β = 2, there are steady states with
(η, p1, p2) = (−1.103, 0.196, 0.679), (0, 0, 0), and (1.103, 0.679, 0.196) (x1, the market
share of the first firm, at these three points is 0.224, 0.5 and 0.776 respectively). That
is, there is a symmetric outcome, where the market is equally divided. But there also
exist steady states, where firm 1 has a high goodwill, and hence high equilibrium price
and market share, and a mirror image outcome, where firm 2 is dominant.
Some additional qualitative information can be obtained from drawing a phase di-
agram. Luckily, it is possible to reduce the original dynamic system in (η, ξ1, ξ2) to a
two dimensional one in (η, q). From (13), one can obtain
q˙ − 1− 2x1 + 2x
2
1
x1(1− x1)
(η˙ − q˙) + (u1 + u2)(ξ˙1 + ξ˙2) = 0 (16)
It is possible then to solve for q˙ though the resulting equation is diﬃcult to work
with except for specific examples. For example, for the sample parameter values given
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above, one can construct the phase diagram in Figure 1. The three equilibrium points
identified in the numerical example above are labelled e1, e2 and e3 respectively. From
the diagram (and confirmed by numerical analysis) one can see that the steady states e1
and e3 are saddlepoints under the dynamics investigated here, and hence approachable
under optimal dynamic policies, whereas the symmetric steady state is e2 is unstable.
The next result confirms and generalizes our numerical results: for β large enough there
are multiple equilibria and the symmetric outcome is no longer stable.
Proposition 2 Assume u1 = u2 = u. Then, there is a symmetric steady state at
(η, q) = (0, 0). Define
β =
6(1 + r)
u(3 + r)
≥ 2
u
. (17)
Then if β ∈ (0, β), where β is as given above, then the symmetric steady state is unique,
and is a saddlepoint and hence dynamically approachable. However, for β = β, there is
a bifurcation, and for β > β the symmetric steady state at (0, 0) is dynamically unstable.
Furthermore, for β > β there exist two other equilibria, which are saddlepoints.
Proof: In the Appendix.
The above result establishes the possibility of multiple steady states, but there are
other good reasons for believing that there should be three possible outcomes. Suppose
we look at consumer behavior under this particular learning model under the assumption
that each firm adopted a constant price, then we would have
x˙1 = βx1(1− x1)(η˙) = βx1(1− x1)(u(2x1 − 1)− η).
But from the choice rule (5), β(η − q) = log x1 − log(1− x1). This gives
x˙1 = βx1(1− x1)
µ
u(2x1 − 1)− q +
1
β
(log(1− x1)− log x1)
¶
. (18)
This is a perturbed form of the evolutionary replicator dynamic.11 The replicator
dynamics are in eﬀect the limit of these dynamics as β approaches infinity (that is,
the replicator dynamics are (18) without the logarithmic terms). Therefore, for β large,
this equation will have three equilibria which will be close to those of the replicator
dynamics in this context, which are x1 = 0, x1 = 1, and x1 = (u + q)/(2u). It can
be checked that it is the two extreme equilibria that are asymptotically stable. That
is, a consumer can, by pure force of habit, become locked into exclusively purchasing
one good, and this may not be the one with higher quality. There is a correspondence
with the equilibria found above: e1 represents the consumer becoming locked into the
second firm, e3 being locked into the first firm’s product and e2 is the unstable interior
equilibrium.
11For more detailed analysis of the connection between diﬀerent learning models and the replicator
dynamics, see Hopkins (2002).
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Figure 1: Sample Phase Diagram
Of course, the diﬀerence in the full model is that price is not constant, and in-
deed each firm will choose a dynamic pricing scheme to increase the probability of the
consumer becoming locked into its product. Thus, this model implies a considerable
first-mover advantage. If initial conditions are such that the consumer has a preference
for one particular brand, one would expect convergence to an outcome favorable to that
firm. Thus looking at the phase diagram in Figure 1, one can see that if η(0) is small
but positive, the first firm can choose a low price which will place him on the stable
manifold leading to e3. That is, by choosing a low initial price, the first firm can get
naive consumers “hooked”. The penalty is that even in the long run, from Proposition
1 the first firm must charge a price below the (myopic) duopoly price.
What happens if the two firms are not symmetric and one holds a quality advantage?
By continuity, for u1 slightly greater than u2 there must also be multiple steady states
close to those we found when u1 and u2 were equal. That is, there will still be a steady
state where the inferior firm dominates. Of course, we have seen that for low values of
the precision parameter β there may be only one steady state. However, the next result
shows that for β suﬃciently large, there exists a steady state where the inferior firm
dominates and has a market share arbitrarily close to one. This is the case no matter
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Figure 2: Steady State Values of Relative Goodwill (η) and Relative Price (q)
the degree of the quality advantage of the other firm.
Proposition 3 Suppose u2 > u1 > 0: firm 2 has a quality advantage. For any  > 0,
there exists a β > 0 such that there is a steady state outcome where u1 − η <  and
x2 < .
Proof: In the Appendix.
To illustrate this further, Figure 2 presents diagrammatically numerical calculations
of how the steady states change with the degree of asymmetry. We fix the parameters
β, r, u2 at 2,1,2 respectively. The quality of the first firm u1 is varied and appears on
the horizontal axis, while steady state values of relative goodwill η (first panel) and
relative price q (second panel) are shown on the vertical axis. For u1 < 1.72, there is
a unique steady state.12 For u1 > 1.72, there are three branches each representing a
steady state, corresponding to e1, e2 and e3 of Figure 1.
This illustrates there are two possible regimes in the asymmetric case. For u1 < 2,
the second firm (quality fixed at u2 = 2) is the high quality firm. For u1 < 1.72, there is
only one steady state. Here, both η and q are negative, and the second firm, the higher
quality one, dominates. But at u1 = 1.72 two further branches of steady states appear
corresponding to e2 and e3. As u1 increases above 2, the quality advantage to firm 1
grows. The distance between e1 and e2 narrows and the distance between e2 and e3
increases. Remember that if the initial value of η is intermediate between that at e1 (e3)
12As we have seen, there are multiple steady states only when β is high. Low values of u1 and u2,
given the logit choice rule, are like low values of β: low incentives like a low value of the precision
parameter mean a low probability of a best response.
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and e2 we would expect the system to converge to e1 (e3). That is, the relative size of
the basin of attraction of the higher quality firm is growing with its quality advantage.
This illustrates that even adaptive consumers do respond to quality diﬀerences.
First, if the parameter constellation is such that there is only one steady state, then in
that steady state the higher quality firm dominates. Second, when there are multiple
steady states, the relative size of the basin of attraction of the steady state where the
higher quality firm dominates is larger than the steady state where the lower quality
firm dominates. However, it remains true that dominance by a low quality firm is a
possibility if the initial value of goodwill η is suﬃciently close to the appropriate steady
state.
5 Comparison with Belief-Based Learning
In this section, I compare the conclusions of the previous section with a similar analysis
when learning is based on beliefs, rather than familiarity. I find that, in contrast,
asymptotically beliefs are correct, and so in the long run, firms’ pricing decisions are
the same as in a static model. However, in the short run, firms may make “introductory
oﬀers”, that is, a low price to induce consumers to try a product for which initially they
have a low opinion. These results on dynamic pricing are similar to those found by
Shapiro (1983) and, more recently, Bergemann and Välimäki (2004) for the monopoly
case. The point made here is that results with belief-based learning are similar to those
with more traditional models, but are quite diﬀerent from those with learning with
familiarity we have just seen.
We consider belief based learning, but adaptive and model free, in that agents have
no beliefs about the payoﬀ generating process. In particular, Sarin and Vahid (1999)
propose an adaptive learning model which is particularly applicable when an agent has
partial information in the sense of Rustichini (1999). Or, in the present context, it
should be appropriate for the case of experience goods. Fudenberg and Levine (1998,
Chapter 4) propose a similar model. The essence of both is that the agent keeps track
of the average realized payoﬀ to the diﬀerent actions available, and chooses the action
with the highest average with high probability. The rule was given in Section 2 as rule
(3).
The diﬀerence between the updating rule of Sarin and Vahid (3) and the rule (2)
in the previous section is that now the goodwill toward the good not chosen does not
decay. This may seem a slight diﬀerence, but it is crucial. In the model of the previous
section, the goodwill toward the good not chosen deteriorated. Hence, the consumer
became continuously more convinced that she had chosen correctly. Here, because
one’s estimate of the quality of the good not chosen does not change, this prevents one
becoming locked into the other good through pure force of habit.
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Moving to expected motion and continuous time, one obtains
θ˙1 = x1(u1 − θ1), θ˙2 = (1− x1)(u2 − θ2). (19)
Notice one important thing. In the case of experience goods/partial information, the
consumer can only update her estimate of the quality of good i when she chooses good i.
The speed of learning of the quality of a good is therefore proportional to the probability
of choosing it. For example, θ˙1 is proportional to x1. Therefore, a rise in the price of
a firm by lowering the probability of purchase will slow the consumer’s learning about
that firm’s quality.
The Hamiltonian for each firm is now
Hi = pixi + µixi(ui − θi) + νixj(uj − θj) (20)
This gives us first order conditions of
∂Hi
∂pi
= xi + pi
∂xi
∂pi
+ µi
∂xi
∂pi
(ui − θi)− νi
∂xi
∂pi
(uj − θj) = 0 (21)
for i = 1, 2 and j = 3− i. From this, it is possible to obtain
pi =
1
βxj
− µi(ui − θi) + νi(uj − θj) (22)
where µi and νi are the respective solutions to
µ˙i = µi(xi + r)− xi, ν˙i = νi(1− xi + r) + xi. (23)
In the steady state one can calculate from (19) that θi = ui for i = 1, 2 and from
(22) one can see that the price solves pi = 1/(β(1− xi)), just as in (9). Hence, we have
the following result.
Proposition 4 In the model of experience goods with the Sarin and Vahid learning
model, asymptotically the consumer has a correct perception of the quality of the two
goods, θi = ui, and the firms charge the myopic duopoly prices pˆ(u∗).
Proof: In the Appendix.
That is, there is complete learning. In the limit, the consumer knows the true values
of u1 and u2. While this result follows directly from the specification of the learning rule,
it remains important for two reasons. First, it highlights the source of the problems with
the reinforcement rule. As this learning rule performs well under partial information,
partial information in itself cannot be the reason that causes lock-in. Rather, it is how
one adjusts assessments of actions not chosen. Second, as most research on learning in
economics has concentrated on reinforcement learning, this type of result while simple
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is still novel.13 This concentration of researchers on reinforcement learning in turn
suggests that writing down a learning rule that is well-behaved in a situation of partial
information is not as simple as it might seem.
Since in the limit neither firm can influence the consumer’s beliefs, the price asymp-
totically approaches its myopic level. However, pricing away from the steady state will
not necessarily be myopic. Indeed, it is possible to characterize this diﬀerence more
precisely. As a convenient simplification, assume that the consumer initially has correct
beliefs about second brand, but still has some learning to do about the first firm’s prod-
uct. That is, assume θ2(0) is equal to u2 but that θ1(0) is not equal to u1. Then, one can
show that, away from the steady state, the optimal price for both firms is higher (lower)
than the myopic price pˆ if θ1 is greater (lower) than u1. Clearly, when the consumer
is initially pessimistic about the first brand believing it worse that it really is, the first
firm has an incentive to induce the consumer to try its product as this will improve the
consumer’s opinion. However, when consumers are optimistic, the firm has an incentive
to raise prices to slow consumer learning.14 A higher price will decrease frequency of
purchase and hence reduce the speed at which θ1 falls to u1.
Proposition 5 Assume θ2(0) = u2 but that θ1(0) 6= u1. Then, let p∗(η) solve (22).
If θ1(0) > u1 (θ1(0) < u1), the price of the first firm is set higher (lower) than the
myopic level, that is, p∗1(η) > pˆ1(η) (p
∗
1(η) < pˆ1(η)), for all finite time. If θ1(0) > u1
(θ1(0) < u1), the price of the second firm is set higher (lower) than the myopic level,
that is, p∗2(η) < pˆ2(η) (p
∗
2(η) > pˆ2(η)), for all finite time.
Proof: In the Appendix.
Note that the above proposition reveals that the firm whose quality is known will
also respond to the consumer’s uncertainty about its rival. If the consumer’s opinion
about the other product is initially lower than the true value, that is θ1(0) < u1, the
second firm has an incentive to charge a price lower than in a static duopoly for the
same level of goodwill. First, this represents a competitive response to the lower price
of firm 1, which is trying to build up custom. But there is a second motive: it is to
slow learning about the quality of the rival product.
6 Heterogeneity and Open Loop Equilibrium
There are well known limitations to open loop equilibrium as a solution concept for
dynamic games. As it involves the firms choosing their pricing policies once and for all
13This type of result seems well known in artificial intelligence, however. See Sutton and Barto
(1998).
14This eﬀect is over and above the incentive to charge a high price because θ1 is high. This latter
eﬀect is included in pˆ.
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at the start of the game, it does not allow them to revise their choices in the light of
experience. Here, a literal reading of the formal model presented here would support
the use of open loop equilibrium as the evolution of the representative consumer’s
goodwill is deterministic and so both firms can make accurate forecasts of how demand
will evolve given initial conditions and their choice of pricing policy. However, there
are many problems with using a representative agent or consumer (Kirman (1992)).
Indeed, the deterministic equations employed here are only approximations of the true
point of interest: the behaviour of a large number of heterogeneous consumers whose
own experience is history dependent and driven by random shocks. Therefore, it is
important to ask exactly how good an approximation this is.
In a static setting, logit demand functions are used precisely in order to model the
aggregate demand of a large population (see, for example, Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991)).
In the current notation, suppose a large population chose brand 1 if and only if η−q > 0
and goodwill η was distributed in the population according to a logistic distribution,
then aggregate demand would be given by the logit demand (5). However, the problem
in the current dynamic setting is that individual goodwill will evolve stochastically
according to which good is purchased and the realisations of payoﬀ shocks. Thus even if
the initial distribution of goodwill is logistic, it is unlikely to remain so. Since modelling
an endogenous distribution is extremely challenging, some kind of approximation is
called for. Furthermore, I would argue that averaging over this changing population is
not nonsensical.
This argument is stronger in the belief-based learning case. In this case, asymptot-
ically beliefs will be correct. Or, more precisely, one can adapt the results here, by use
of stochastic approximation theory, to show that in the truly stochastic case beliefs will
be nearly correct with high probability. Exactly how dispersed beliefs will be depends
on the model’s parameters, particularly β and δ. It remains possible for an individual
to have a series of realisations that would take her beliefs far from the correct level.
However, if the population is large, then the law of large numbers would ensure that a
large proportion of the population at any time would have beliefs close to being correct
(there are no aggregate shocks in this model only individual).15 Beliefs for most of the
population will also be close to the average belief, and so the average consumer will be
a good approximation for the population distribution.
In the reinforcement learning case, we have seen that when the the precision para-
meter β is suﬃciently high, consumers will tend to become locked into choosing one
brand only. With a population of consumers, there would be a critical level of relative
goodwill such that for consumers with goodwill greater (lower) than this, they would be
expected to be attracted toward always purchasing brand one (two). Even this would
not be problematic for a deterministic approximation based on a consumer with average
goodwill, provided all consumers have initial goodwill close to the average level. In this
15If one wanted to model the case where payoﬀ shocks are correlated (e.g. firms sometimes produce
a bad batch of the product and/or there are taste shocks that are driven by fads that transmit across
individuals), then indeed one should look at the Markov perfect equilibrium of a truly stochastic model.
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case, (nearly) all consumers will become locked in to the same brand as the average
consumer, and the average consumer provides a good approximation.
However, suppose goodwill was initially relatively dispersed so that there were sig-
nificant numbers on both sides of the critical level. Then a substantial proportion of
consumers would be attracted to a diﬀerent brand than the average consumer. The
deterministic model predicts dominance for the initially advantaged firm, yet many
consumers would actually be faithful to the other brand. That is, in this case the cur-
rent model does not fit well. What would do better? Tracking a diverging population
is technically diﬃcult. Simulation, such as in Kirman and Vriend (2001), is one way
forward. Another might be to have two representative consumers, each one represent-
ing a proportion of the population. Preliminary work in this direction indicates the
possibility of even more equilibria than in Section 4. The additional equilibria capture
the possibility of each firm having a mass of loyal consumers. However, equilibria with
the market dominated by one firm still exist. Detailed exploration of these possibilities
is left to further research.
7 Empirical Implications
An interesting question is whether the diﬀering theoretical predictions of the learning
models described above can be subject to empirical testing. Of course, there is now a
large literature on testing learning models with data from experiments.16 However, the
work of Chintagunta and Rao (CR) (1996) and Ho and Chong (2002) suggests the fas-
cinating possibility of using field data instead. In this section, we formulate a testable
hypothesis and consider whether CR’s existing empirical work helps to distinguish be-
tween diﬀerent models of learning.
CR analyze scanner panel data on the purchases of yogurt over a two year period.
An immediate diﬀerence between such marketing data sets and experimental data is
that while choices, that is which brand was purchased, may be recorded, payoﬀs in
this context are fundamentally unobservable. We have no way of knowing the level of
satisfaction derived from the consumption of a good, or, in the present notation, we can
neither observe ui or u˜i. To circumvent this problem, CR normalize the utility from
each purchase to one. It is still possible, using the observed choices, to construct values
for each θi(t) by using the following formula based on the reinforcement learning rule
(2),
θi(t+ 1) = (1− δ)θi(t) + δIi(t). (24)
Here, Ii(t) is the indicator function, taking value 1 if the consumer purchased brand i
16Some works of many in this field are Erev and Roth (1998), Camerer and Ho (1999) for games,
and Erev and Barron (2001) for decision problems.
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at time t and zero otherwise. CR then employ logit regressions of the form
Pr[choose good i at time t] =
exp(αi + βiθi(t) + γipi(t))P2
j=1 exp(αj + βjθj(t) + γjpj(t))
(25)
This specification allows for diﬀerent sensitivities β1, β2 to the stock of goodwill for
diﬀerent brands. Thus diﬀerent quality levels for the two brands will enter through
diﬀerent estimates for each βi rather than diﬀerent values for u˜i.
One important conclusion from our earlier analysis of consumer learning using the
reinforcement learning rule is that outcomes will be history dependent. A consumer
will become locked into the brand which she purchases most frequently, possibly simply
because of an initial preference. Thus, if this model is an accurate description of actual
consumer behavior, a logit regression should find positive and significant estimated
coeﬃcients on the measures of goodwill θi that depend on past purchases.
We could take a similar approach using the Sarin-Vahid belief-based model. How-
ever, one crucial diﬀerence becomes apparent. By Proposition 4, in the steady state,
under the Sarin-Vahid model, each θi is at its “correct” value and independent of the
consumer’s purchase history. Diﬀering levels of quality should instead appear in diﬀering
estimates of α1 and α2. We can summarize this argument in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 Consider logit regressions of the form (25) with θ constructed from the
procedure (24). If the reinforcement learning model correctly describes consumer behav-
ior, a regression including the θi variables that reflect recent purchase history should
outperform a regression with them omitted. However, if learning is belief-based, the
reverse should be true.
The interesting thing is that CR eﬀectively tested this hypothesis in their original
paper by running an alternative regression in which the θ variables were omitted. This
regression performed significantly worse in terms of log likelihood than the regression
with the θi included. When the θi were included, the coeﬃcients βi were significant
and positive. Ho and Chong (1999) also perform logit regressions on consumer data but
using a somewhat more complex reinforcement learning model.17 They also find eﬀects
from recent purchases. Thus, it seems that actual consumer behavior gives stronger
support for the reinforcement learning model than for the model of Sarin and Vahid.
Some caution, however, should be exercised in making this assessment. A crucial
assumption in making Hypothesis 1 above, was that the empirical data reflects steady
state behavior, an assumption also made by CR in their analysis. As we have seen in
Section 5, out of the steady state, in the Sarin and Vahid model learning is aﬀected by
17The published version (Ho and Chong (2003)) does not use logit, but the conclusions are similar.
They also find an eﬀect similar to hypothetical reinforcement, even though the products in question
are experience goods. It seems that seeing a product in a store may reinforce one’s memory of it, even
if it is not purchased at that time.
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the choices made. It is only asymptotically that one’s quality estimates θi are indepen-
dent of choices. Thus, the fact that the model including purchase history outperforms
the model with it omitted, may only reflect non-equilibrium behavior, not a failure of
the Sarin-Vahid model. This problem of discontinuity, that near the steady state the
propensities θ have a significant eﬀect but at the steady state their influence disappears,
is highlighted by Blume et al. (2002). They argue that it is therefore relatively dif-
ficult to separate diﬀerent learning models econometrically once play is at or close to
equilibrium, as opposed to when learning is still active.
In this spirit, we can oﬀer a new test between the two forms of learning, that does not
depend on equilibrium having been reached. Although there have been several attempts
to distinguish between belief-based and reinforcement learning they have concentrated
on whether agents do or do not use information about foregone payoﬀs, that is, they
test between rules (4) and (2). For example, Camerer and Ho (1999) estimate an model
that nests those two rules. In a similar way, we could could nest rules (2) and (3) by
replacing the empirical formulation (24) with
θi(t+ 1) = (1− δ1)θi(t) + δ1Ii(t)
θj(t+ 1) = (1− δ2)θj(t), for all j 6= i (26)
That is, if δ1 = δ2 we have the reinforcement learning model, and if δ2 = 0 and δ1 > 0
we have the belief-based model.
Hypothesis 2 Suppose we jointly estimate the parameters (β, γ, δ1, δ2) using the pro-
cedure (26) to construct estimates of the goodwill θ. If the reinforcement learning model
correctly describes consumer behavior, estimates of δ2 should be positive and close to
those for δ1. However, if learning is belief-based, estimates of δ2 should not be signifi-
cantly diﬀerent from zero.
This hypothesis, to my knowledge, has not yet been tested either with experimental
data or data on actual consumer choices.
8 Conclusion
This paper explores the consequences of recent advances in adaptive learning theory
for the analysis of consumer behavior. The case of experience goods corresponds to
partial information in the learning literature. Two diﬀerent models of learning are
compared in this setting. The first, a model of reinforcement learning, may be biased
with consumers becoming locked into inferior choices. This leads to the possibility of
multiple steady states. When there are multiple states, the stable ones are those which
involve dominance by one firm. Under a model of belief-based learning, due to Sarin
and Vahid (1999), consumers will learn accurately in the long run and so there is only
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one long run equilibrium. However, in the short run a seller has an incentive to charge a
price diﬀerent from the myopic maximum to aﬀect the speed at which consumers learn.
Whether these diﬀerent models can be separated empirically is an interesting ques-
tion. The availability of consumer scanner data now permits investigation by the ex-
amination of individual consumer behavior. In Section 7 of this paper, two simple tests
for the identification of diﬀerent types of learning behavior were suggested. Some of the
existing empirical evidence, both from the laboratory and field consumer data, seems
to give greater support for the reinforcement learning model that predicts suboptimal
behavior even in the long run.
The market outcomes under reinforcement learning are probably best interpreted as
an important first mover advantage. Familiarity with an existing brand will make the
establishment of an alternative diﬃcult, even if it is higher quality, at least under price
competition. It is an open question whether there would be a diﬀerent conclusion if
other forms of competition were included. For example, it has long been asserted that
certain forms of advertising convey no information, but only serve to aid familiarity.
Thus, the investigation of the eﬀect of advertising when consumers are reinforcement
learners seems a natural complement to the current research.
The assumptions and methodology employed in this paper are quite diﬀerent from
those of the strategic approach to dynamic pricing. It would be interesting to analyze
the robustness of the two types of model. In particular, both the assumption that all
consumers can act as though they understand the intuitive criterion and the present
alternative, that all consumers are incapable of any strategic inference, seem extreme.
Some heterogeneity amongst consumers would seem more reasonable. For example,
how would the current results change if a proportion of consumers were sophisticated
rather than adaptive? Or, for example, can one successfully signal high quality when
such a signal is simply not understood by a proportion of its intended audience? As
a final remark, the existing experimental evidence, for example, Cooper, Garvin and
Kagel (1997), as well as supporting heterogeneity, suggests that adaptive learning does
better than equilibrium refinements at explaining actual human behavior.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: From the equation (14) one can calculate the equilibrium
value of ξ1 as x1/(1 + r) > 0. Second, if at any point ξ1 were negative, given (14), ξ1
would clearly diverge to negative infinity. Hence, ξ1 is always positive on any optimal
path. Similarly, one can calculate that ξ2 is always negative. Comparing (13) with the
myopic first order condition (9), it is easy to see that p∗1 < pˆ1 and p
∗
2 < pˆ2 if ξ1 > 0
and ξ2 < 0. More formally, diﬀerentiating the first order conditions, and evaluating the
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second order derivatives at the equilibrium point, we have·
−βx1 βx21
βx22 −βx2
¸ ·
dp1
dp2
¸
=
·
u1 + u2)dξ1
−(u1 + u2)dξ2
¸
.
It is then easy to verify that ∂p∗1/∂ξ1 < 0 and ∂p
∗
1/∂ξ2 > 0, and, equally, ∂p
∗
2/∂ξ1 < 0
and ∂p∗2/∂ξ2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2: From (15) a steady state of the open loop equilibrium with
u1 = u2 = u will simultaneously satisfy
u(2x1(η, q)− 1) = η (27)
and, from the first order conditions (13) together with the steady state of the costate
dynamics (14),
1
β(1− x1(η, q))
− 1
βx1(η, q)
− 2u(2x1(η, q)− 1)
1 + r
= q (28)
Indeed, it is easily established that (η, q) = (0, 0), implying x1 = x2 = 1/2, is such a
state.
We have a dynamical system on (η, q) defined by simultaneous diﬀerential equations
(11) and (16). The Jacobian at (0,0) can be calculated as
J =
·
βu/2− 1 −βu/2
−2(2 + r − βu)/3 1 + r − 2βu/3
¸
.
The determinant |J | = −1+βu/2+r(βu/6−1) which is negative (positive) for β < (>)β.
Thus, the symmetric steady state (0,0) is a saddlepoint for low β, but as the trace is
positive for β = β, the equilibrium is a source for β > β.
Thus we have a bifurcation at β (and at β alone, as this is the only value for
which J is singular). We now show that it is a pitchfork bifurcation, so that as the
symmetric steady state changes from a saddlepoint to a source, two new saddlepoint
steady states are created. We verify this by application of Theorem 10.1a in Tu (1994),
which provides conditions that the bifurcation is not degenerate.18 If the conditions
are met, the theorem states that two curves of equilibria, in the space (η, q, β) intersect
at (0, 0, β), so that there are multiple equilibria for β > β. The conditions are that
Jy1 = 0 and y2 · J = 0 for non-zero vectors y1, y2, that is there are non-degenerate left
and right eigenvectors corresponding to the zero eigenvalue of J evaluated at (0,0), but
also that y2 · Jβy1 6= 0, where Jβ is the derivative of J with respect to β. We have
y2 · Jβy1 =
·
−(1− r)/3
1
¸ ·
u/2 −u/2
2u/3 −2u/3
¸ ·
3(1 + r)/(2r)
1
¸
=
u(3 + r)2
12r
6= 0.
18An example of a “degenerate” bifurcation is a linear system, where there is always a single equi-
librium point even when a change in parameters change the sign of one of the eigenvalues.
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There must be two additional equilibria and they must be saddlepoints by verifi-
cation that the bifurcation is of the supercritical pitchfork type.19 To do this, I apply
results from Kuznetsov (1995, Chapter 7). The dynamical system we consider is en-
tirely symmetric, in that (η˙(η, q), q˙(η, q)) = −(η˙(−η,−q), q˙(−η,−q)). That is, if we
write y = (η, q) and y˙ = f(y, β), then Rf(y, β) = −f(Ry, β), where R = −I and I is
the identity matrix. Therefore, in the terminology of Kuznetsov, the dynamical system
is Z2-equivariant. Kuznetsov defines the set X− such that Ry = −y for y ∈ X−, thus
here X− = IR2. Now, by Theorem 7.7 of Kuznetsov (1995), for a Z2-equivariant system,
when the eigenvector corresponding to the zero eigenvalue is in the setX−, a bifurcation
will be of the pitchfork type. Now, as here X− is whole space, the eigenvector is in
X−, and the bifurcation is a pitchfork. Furthermore, as we know from above that the
negative eigenvalue of J moves to positive as β increases, the bifurcation is supercritical.
That is, we move from one to three equilibria, with the new equilibria having the same
stability properties that the original equilibrium possessed for β < β. That is, they are
saddlepoints as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 3: The first step is to show that in any steady state where
η > 0, then q < η. The myopic duopoly equilibrium given by (9) defines implicitly
a myopic level of relative price qˆ(η). We have, clearly, qˆ(0) = 0 and, by the implicit
function theorem, ∂qˆ(η)/∂η = ((1 − x1)2 + x21)/((1 − x1)2 + x1) < 1. So, qˆ(η) < η for
η > 0. Comparison of the myopic conditions (9) with the steady state of the dynamic
equilibrium (15) shows that the dynamically optimal level q∗ will be less than qˆ for
η > qˆ > 0 as this implies x1 < 1/2. So, q∗ < η in any steady state with η > 0. Fix
q at its equilibrium level q∗(η) and substitute into the second equation in the steady
state conditions (15). Since, q∗(η) < η, we have by the properties of the logit choice
function (5), limβ→∞ x1(η, q∗(η)) = 1, and consequently limβ→∞ η∗(q∗(η)) = u1. The
result follows.
Proof of Proposition 4: Inspection of the system of diﬀerential equations in (19)
reveals that for x1 ∈ (0, 1), there is only one fixed point which is (θ1, θ2) = (u1, u2). It
is easy to prove (e.g. V = (θ1 − u1)2 + (θ2 − u2)2 is a suitable Liapunov function) that
this fixed point is a global attractor, again for x1 ∈ (0, 1). But, given the functional
form (5), it is always true that x1 ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 5: If θ1(0) > u1 it is easy to demonstrate that θ1 converges
asymptotically to u1 but that θ1(t) > u1 for all finite t. One can then compare the
myopic first order conditions (9) with (22) and see that p∗1 > pˆ1 if µ1 > 0. Again,
examining (23), it is clear that µ1 must always be positive to be able to attain its steady
state value which is positive. For p∗2, it is clear that ν2 must always be negative to be
able to attain its steady state value which is negative. More formally, diﬀerentiating the
first order conditions, and evaluating the second order derivatives at the equilibrium
19A pitchfork bifurcation occurs when, as the bifurcation parameter (here β) passes the critical
level, there is a change from 1 to 3 equilibria. This is supercritical if, at the same time, the original
equilibrium changes from stable to unstable.
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point, we have ·
−βx1 βx21
βx22 −βx2
¸ ·
dp1
dp2
¸
=
·
(u1 − θ1)dµ1
−(u1 − θ1)dν2
¸
.
So, we have ∂p∗1/∂µ1 > 0 when θ1 > u1.
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